基于博弈理论的医疗机构中药制剂委托配制行为分析

Analysis of Chinese Medicine Preparations in Medical Institutions Entrustment Behavior Based on Game Theory

关键词:  医疗机构中药制剂  委托配制  博弈论

Key words:  Chinese medical preparations in medical institution  entrusted preparation  game theory

摘要:

目的 探讨在推行医疗机构中药制剂委托配制时利益主体间的行为选择因素及委托配制行为的可行性。方法 基于博弈理论，分别构建政府与医疗机构、医疗机构与受托方之间的博弈模型，分析影响委托配制行为的影响因素并提出相应的政策建议。结果 在政府与医疗机构的博弈中，政府实施监管的成本、损失的社会效益和医疗机构获得的财政补贴、惩罚、产品声誉优势是影响配制行为的重要因素；在医疗机构与受托方的博弈中，医疗机构的收益、自行配制的成本和受托方的收益、转型成本也对委托配制行为产生影响。结论 医疗机构中药制剂委托配制行为具有可行性，各利益主体间找到利润均衡点，就能够实现医疗机构中药制剂的良性循环。

Abstract:

OBJECTIVE To explore the factors of behavior selection among the stakeholders and the feasibility of the behavior of entrusted preparation of Chinese medicine preparations in medical institutions. METHODS Based on the game theory, the game models between the government and the medical institution, the medical institution and the entrusted party were constructed, and the influencing factors affecting the commissioned preparation behavior were analyzed and corresponding policy suggestions were put forward. RESULTS In the game between government and medical institution, the cost of government supervision, the social benefit lost and the financial subsidy, punishment and product reputation advantage obtained by medical institution were the important factors that affect the preparations behavior. In the game between the medical institution and the trustee, the income of the medical institution, the cost of self-compounding and the income and cost of the trustee also affected the behavior of the entrusted preparation. CONCLUSION It is feasible to entrust the preparation of Chinese medicine preparations in medical institutions. Finding the equilibrium point of profit among the stakeholders can realize the benign cycle of Chinese medicine preparation in medical institutions.